Goodbye to Ted and all that
By Perry Flint | July 1, 2008
ATW Online
United Airlines' decision to pull the plug on Ted, which it announced last month at the same time that it said it would retire 100 aircraft in response to the record surge in oil prices, means that the curtain finally has come down on what may be the US legacy airline industry's longest-lived and most futile effort to respond to the changing face of airline competition without fundamentally altering its business model.
Shuttle by United, CALite, MetroJet, Delta Express, Song and Ted each represented an effort to counter the rising popularity of low-fare carriers, primarily Southwest Airlines but also AirTran and JetBlue. All of them eventually were shut down, often at the dawn of a new crisis, such as 9/11, although up until the last day airline senior management insisted that they were working as planned. Managements either were deluding themselves or simply bluffing.
In the end, it doesn't really matter. As our annual World Airline Report (beginning on p. 26) shows, Southwest became the world's largest airline by passengers last year. It has posted annual profits in each of the past 35 years, and although it is being crunched by oil prices, it is not unrealistic to expect that it will make money in 2008 thanks to its oil hedges.
The airline-within-an-airline concept, on the other hand, likely will go down as the industry's version of General Motors' Saturn project. Saturn is GM's long-running effort to create a car company within a car company capable of building an automobile that is competitive with foreign imports without fundamentally changing GM itself. GM has poured billions of dollars into Saturn, and its cars have a small but loyal following, but Saturn has not stopped GM's steady market decline. Similarly, Shuttle by United could not protect United's California intrastate markets from Southwest's inroads, nor could MetroJet save US Airways at Baltimore/Washington after WN arrived.
Last month, speaking before the Wings Club in New York, former American Airlines Chairman and CEO Robert Crandall said what a lot of people probably have been thinking. "Fuel prices are not the core of the problem" facing US airlines, he declared, and he reminded his audience that "Lots of folks . . . can rememberas I dowhen the industry lost money while paying far less for fuel than it does today."
Instead, he pointed at another culprit: Airline deregulation. "Unfettered competition just doesn't work very well in certain industries, as amply demonstrated by our airline experience," he argued.
"[US] airlines, once world leaders, are now laggards in every category, including fleet age, service quality and international reputation," he went on. "Fewer and fewer flights are on time
. . . Passenger complaints have skyrocketed. Airline service, by any standard, has become unacceptable."
It is tough to argue with that assessment, particularly coming as it did from a man who as much as anyone shaped the deregulated industry. However, nowhere in his speech did he mention the exception, the one company that has soared throughout the deregulated era: Southwest.
Interestingly, during their heyday as cross-town competitors, Crandall enjoyed a friendly rivalry with Herb Kelleher (who stepped down as chairman of Southwest in May) and used to tweak him from time to time about Southwest's lack of frills, particularly after WN began stretching out in the mid-90s with transcontinental flights.
Today it is pretty hard to make the case that an American, Delta or United offers more "frills" than Southwest on competing routes. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the hard work, loyalty and dedication of customer service employees at the legacy carriers, many would say that Southwest is a friendlier airline with a superior customer focus.
Next month, ATW will take a look at the puzzle of airline deregulation and why US carriers suffer so much more pain when trouble arrives than their counterparts in Europe and Asia, so we don't want to spill all the beans here.
We believe, however, that a further comparison to the fate of the US automobile industry is warranted.
Between 1947 and the first oil shock of 1973-74, the US auto industry was the envy of the world. But Ford, GM and Chrysler failed to adapt to changing consumer tastes, an evolving environmental sensibility and a preference for reliability over style.
They also were hurt by an "us-or-them" approach to labor/management relations and by growing retiree health and pension burdens. Most of all, they lost touch with their customers, the car-buying public, and left the door wide open to competitors who were more willing to listen.
Does that sound like anyone in the airline industry these days?
http://atwonline.com/it-distribution/article/editorial-goodbye-ted-all-0309
Mostrando postagens com marcador Recordar é Viver - 2008. Mostrar todas as postagens
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quarta-feira, 1 de julho de 2009
terça-feira, 30 de dezembro de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] Justiça suspende liberação de tarifas aéreas a partir do dia 1º
Publicada em 30/12/2008 às 08h39m
Valor Online
SÃO PAULO - O sindicato das empresas aéreas conseguiu suspender na Justiça a resolução da Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Anac) que libera os preços das passagens internacionais a partir de 1º de janeiro. Neste momento, a liberação atingiria unicamente a TAM entre as empresas brasileiras do setor aéreo.
O Sindicato Nacional das Empresas Aeroviárias (Snea) obteve, no dia 24, mandado de segurança que bloqueia a liberação tarifária concedido pelo desembargador e presidente do Tribunal Regional Federal (TRF) da 1ª Região, Jirair Aram Meguerian. Ele acatou o argumento apresentado pela entidade de que a Anac deveria ter realizado audiência pública antes de fixar a liberação de preços.
A decisão a favor do Snea ocorre depois de a mesma solicitação ter sido negada à entidade em primeira instância. Mesmo agora, a vitória das empresas não é definitiva. Por ter sido outorgado em período de recesso do judiciário, o pedido do sindicato será apreciado novamente a partir do dia 5 de janeiro por um outro desembargador do TRF, que poderá alterar ou manter a decisão de Meguerian.
A Anac também pode entrar com recurso, mas afirmou ontem que não tem posição formada, uma vez que ainda não foi notificada oficialmente sobre a decisão do TRF.
A resolução que está suspensa elimina gradualmente as tarifas mínimas para viagens ao exterior - com exceção de vôos na América do Sul, onde os preços já são totalmente livres. Hoje, o piso de preço para uma passagem aérea entre Brasil e França, por exemplo, é US$ 869. Pelas novas normas, as companhias estariam livres para aplicar descontos de 20% sobre esses valores a partir de janeiro; 50% a partir de abril e 80% de julho em diante, até a liberdade total em janeiro de 2010.
O Snea foi contrário ao cronograma da Anac. Durante consulta pública sobre o tema, entre setembro e outubro, a entidade sugeriu que o processo de liberalização levasse não 1 ano, mas entre 10 e 20 anos. Em sua argumentação, afirma que as empresas nacionais têm atualmente custos menos competitivos em relação às estrangeiras. Por causa da diferença, as aéreas internacionais teriam mais fôlego para baixar suas tarifas e atrair passageiros. A TAM é hoje a única empresa brasileira afetada pela liberação e pediu, na consulta pública, um prazo dez meses superior ao que foi o dado pela agência.
Mas o argumento do Snea para pedir a suspensão da liberação de preços na Justiça foi em outra direção. Para o sindicato, a agência falhou por não ter convocado, além de uma consulta pública, uma audiência em que os interessados pudessem debater a resolução pessoalmente. Segundo a entidade, a agência descumpriu o artigo 27 da lei de sua criação, que estipula a realização de audiência sobre " iniciativas ou alterações de atos normativos que afetem direitos de agentes econômicos " .
Para o diretor da Anac Ronaldo Seroa da Motta, a liberação de preços em vôos internacionais não requer audiência pública pois " não é uma iniciativa " nem " uma alteração das normas " , uma vez que a lei de criação da agência já determina a liberdade total de preços. " A liberdade deveria estar em vigor desde que a Anac foi criada, em 2005 " , diz. Segundo ele, a agência realizará audiência pública caso a Justiça determine.
(Roberta Campassi | Valor Econômico)
Valor Online
SÃO PAULO - O sindicato das empresas aéreas conseguiu suspender na Justiça a resolução da Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Anac) que libera os preços das passagens internacionais a partir de 1º de janeiro. Neste momento, a liberação atingiria unicamente a TAM entre as empresas brasileiras do setor aéreo.
O Sindicato Nacional das Empresas Aeroviárias (Snea) obteve, no dia 24, mandado de segurança que bloqueia a liberação tarifária concedido pelo desembargador e presidente do Tribunal Regional Federal (TRF) da 1ª Região, Jirair Aram Meguerian. Ele acatou o argumento apresentado pela entidade de que a Anac deveria ter realizado audiência pública antes de fixar a liberação de preços.
A decisão a favor do Snea ocorre depois de a mesma solicitação ter sido negada à entidade em primeira instância. Mesmo agora, a vitória das empresas não é definitiva. Por ter sido outorgado em período de recesso do judiciário, o pedido do sindicato será apreciado novamente a partir do dia 5 de janeiro por um outro desembargador do TRF, que poderá alterar ou manter a decisão de Meguerian.
A Anac também pode entrar com recurso, mas afirmou ontem que não tem posição formada, uma vez que ainda não foi notificada oficialmente sobre a decisão do TRF.
A resolução que está suspensa elimina gradualmente as tarifas mínimas para viagens ao exterior - com exceção de vôos na América do Sul, onde os preços já são totalmente livres. Hoje, o piso de preço para uma passagem aérea entre Brasil e França, por exemplo, é US$ 869. Pelas novas normas, as companhias estariam livres para aplicar descontos de 20% sobre esses valores a partir de janeiro; 50% a partir de abril e 80% de julho em diante, até a liberdade total em janeiro de 2010.
O Snea foi contrário ao cronograma da Anac. Durante consulta pública sobre o tema, entre setembro e outubro, a entidade sugeriu que o processo de liberalização levasse não 1 ano, mas entre 10 e 20 anos. Em sua argumentação, afirma que as empresas nacionais têm atualmente custos menos competitivos em relação às estrangeiras. Por causa da diferença, as aéreas internacionais teriam mais fôlego para baixar suas tarifas e atrair passageiros. A TAM é hoje a única empresa brasileira afetada pela liberação e pediu, na consulta pública, um prazo dez meses superior ao que foi o dado pela agência.
Mas o argumento do Snea para pedir a suspensão da liberação de preços na Justiça foi em outra direção. Para o sindicato, a agência falhou por não ter convocado, além de uma consulta pública, uma audiência em que os interessados pudessem debater a resolução pessoalmente. Segundo a entidade, a agência descumpriu o artigo 27 da lei de sua criação, que estipula a realização de audiência sobre " iniciativas ou alterações de atos normativos que afetem direitos de agentes econômicos " .
Para o diretor da Anac Ronaldo Seroa da Motta, a liberação de preços em vôos internacionais não requer audiência pública pois " não é uma iniciativa " nem " uma alteração das normas " , uma vez que a lei de criação da agência já determina a liberdade total de preços. " A liberdade deveria estar em vigor desde que a Anac foi criada, em 2005 " , diz. Segundo ele, a agência realizará audiência pública caso a Justiça determine.
(Roberta Campassi | Valor Econômico)
domingo, 28 de dezembro de 2008
Oil decline erodes airline fuel hedge value
Sun Dec 28, 2008 4:23pm EST
CHICAGO (Reuters) - Major U.S. airlines are cheering the jaw-dropping decline in fuel prices, but at the same time are wincing that some of the insurance they bought to hedge against fuel spikes seems to have been a waste of money.
To some degree, top carriers all are struggling to blunt the impact of potential fuel price rallies without losing money on hedges if fuel falls more than expected.
Worthless fuel hedges led to huge accounting losses for major airlines in the third quarter. It is likely to happen again in the fourth quarter and could repeat in 2009 because airlines buy their hedges months in advance.
"They were entered into in the second and third quarter when it looked like the sky was the limit (for fuel prices)," said airline consultant Robert Mann. "It certainly did appear that way at the time."
"To the extent that they can't lay (the hedges) off somewhere they're going to have to take some write-downs," Mann said.
He was quick to add, however, that the benefit of cheaper spot market fuel far outweighs the disadvantage of bad hedges.
Southwest Airlines (LUV.N), for example, enjoyed more than $4 billion in hedging proceeds over the last five years and paid far less than rivals because it locked in lower fuel prices while rivals went unhedged.
Hedges are typically derivatives used by companies to lock in a fuel price in advance. The goal is to protect airlines from price volatility.
The amount of hedge-related losses is determined by the type or derivative an airline uses and what obligation is built into the hedge. Airlines also account for the losses in different ways and at different times.
Many airlines use options, which give the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy a commodity at a predetermined price.
But if the market price falls below the preset price floor, hedges become worthless and may even force carriers to pay more than market price.
Top airlines, including UAL Corp's (UAUA.O) United Airlines and US Airways Group (LCC.N) wrote down almost $2 billion in accounting losses for their hedge portfolios.
Southwest Airlines (LUV.N), long the envy of the industry due to its thorough fuel hedges, took a $247 million write-down.
GUESSING GAME
The airline industry was punished in the first half of 2008 by rising oil prices -- which influence jet fuel prices. Oil peaked in mid-July near $150 a barrel.
A global economic crisis has since driven that price down 70 percent, well below the forecasts airlines made when they bought hedge protection months ago.
AMR Corp's (AMR.N) American Airlines, for example, said it has hedged 34 percent of its expected 2009 fuel consumption, guaranteeing a fuel price that is equivalent to $71 to $99 per barrel of oil. That is well above the current price of $39.
United said it has hedged 28 percent of its expected 2009 fuel consumption, locking in a range that equates to $101 to $114 per barrel of oil. Southwest has hedged 75 percent of its 2009 fuel at a price equivalent to $73 per barrel or oil.
On the unhedged portion of their fuel consumption, however, airlines pay market prices.
Southwest Chief Executive Gary Kelly said on a December 2 Webcast with analysts that the airline predicts fuel costs of $2 per gallon -- equivalent to $57 per barrel of oil -- in 2009.
Based on that assumption, Southwest would suffer hedging losses, he said.
"But of course, that is a much lower total fuel cost spend, and that essentially becomes a cost of hedging, if you will," Kelly said.
"If you look at our fuel hedge portfolio performance, of course, over time, it's been extraordinarily successful," Kelly said. "We view it as an insurance program. If you have insurance, you don't get in one year and get out the next. And if you just look at our performance since 2003, we have had $4.2 billion in hedging cash proceeds over that time period."
Experts say that despite the chance for accounting losses, those charges are preferable to the hefty losses suffered by several unhedged top airlines a few years ago.
"Personally, I think anybody who doesn't think fuel prices are going back up, is foolish," Mann, the consultant, said. "That's not a bet I would take."
(Editing by Patrick Fitzgibbons and Derek Caney)
Sun Dec 28, 2008 4:23pm EST
CHICAGO (Reuters) - Major U.S. airlines are cheering the jaw-dropping decline in fuel prices, but at the same time are wincing that some of the insurance they bought to hedge against fuel spikes seems to have been a waste of money.
To some degree, top carriers all are struggling to blunt the impact of potential fuel price rallies without losing money on hedges if fuel falls more than expected.
Worthless fuel hedges led to huge accounting losses for major airlines in the third quarter. It is likely to happen again in the fourth quarter and could repeat in 2009 because airlines buy their hedges months in advance.
"They were entered into in the second and third quarter when it looked like the sky was the limit (for fuel prices)," said airline consultant Robert Mann. "It certainly did appear that way at the time."
"To the extent that they can't lay (the hedges) off somewhere they're going to have to take some write-downs," Mann said.
He was quick to add, however, that the benefit of cheaper spot market fuel far outweighs the disadvantage of bad hedges.
Southwest Airlines (LUV.N), for example, enjoyed more than $4 billion in hedging proceeds over the last five years and paid far less than rivals because it locked in lower fuel prices while rivals went unhedged.
Hedges are typically derivatives used by companies to lock in a fuel price in advance. The goal is to protect airlines from price volatility.
The amount of hedge-related losses is determined by the type or derivative an airline uses and what obligation is built into the hedge. Airlines also account for the losses in different ways and at different times.
Many airlines use options, which give the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy a commodity at a predetermined price.
But if the market price falls below the preset price floor, hedges become worthless and may even force carriers to pay more than market price.
Top airlines, including UAL Corp's (UAUA.O) United Airlines and US Airways Group (LCC.N) wrote down almost $2 billion in accounting losses for their hedge portfolios.
Southwest Airlines (LUV.N), long the envy of the industry due to its thorough fuel hedges, took a $247 million write-down.
GUESSING GAME
The airline industry was punished in the first half of 2008 by rising oil prices -- which influence jet fuel prices. Oil peaked in mid-July near $150 a barrel.
A global economic crisis has since driven that price down 70 percent, well below the forecasts airlines made when they bought hedge protection months ago.
AMR Corp's (AMR.N) American Airlines, for example, said it has hedged 34 percent of its expected 2009 fuel consumption, guaranteeing a fuel price that is equivalent to $71 to $99 per barrel of oil. That is well above the current price of $39.
United said it has hedged 28 percent of its expected 2009 fuel consumption, locking in a range that equates to $101 to $114 per barrel of oil. Southwest has hedged 75 percent of its 2009 fuel at a price equivalent to $73 per barrel or oil.
On the unhedged portion of their fuel consumption, however, airlines pay market prices.
Southwest Chief Executive Gary Kelly said on a December 2 Webcast with analysts that the airline predicts fuel costs of $2 per gallon -- equivalent to $57 per barrel of oil -- in 2009.
Based on that assumption, Southwest would suffer hedging losses, he said.
"But of course, that is a much lower total fuel cost spend, and that essentially becomes a cost of hedging, if you will," Kelly said.
"If you look at our fuel hedge portfolio performance, of course, over time, it's been extraordinarily successful," Kelly said. "We view it as an insurance program. If you have insurance, you don't get in one year and get out the next. And if you just look at our performance since 2003, we have had $4.2 billion in hedging cash proceeds over that time period."
Experts say that despite the chance for accounting losses, those charges are preferable to the hefty losses suffered by several unhedged top airlines a few years ago.
"Personally, I think anybody who doesn't think fuel prices are going back up, is foolish," Mann, the consultant, said. "That's not a bet I would take."
(Editing by Patrick Fitzgibbons and Derek Caney)
domingo, 26 de outubro de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] “Concorrência é sempre bom”
26 de outubro de 2008. | N° 209
Jornal A Notícia - Joiville
ENTREVISTA: DAVID BARIONI NETO/PRESIDENTE DA TAM
Executivo diz que a liberdade tarifária é importante para o setor, mas defende redução tributária
No ano passado, quando assumiu uma companhia abatida pelo maior acidente aéreo da história do País, ninguém imaginava que David Barioni Neto colocaria a TAM em velocidade de cruzeiro tão rapidamente. Trazido da Gol, a principal concorrente, Barioni assumiu a presidência da companhia em novembro e, de lá para cá, só trouxe boas notícias para os acionistas da empresa.
Como a TAM está se preparando para enfrentar a crise?
David Barioni Neto – Lidamos com problemas de petróleo, dólar, crise internacional. A aviação é muito sensível a qualquer crise porque é multifacetada. No momento, estamos mantendo o planejamento estratégico. A TAM tem operações de hedge de petróleo para 50% do consumo dos próximos 12 meses, ao preço médio de US$ 105 o barril. Mantido o preço do petróleo nos níveis atuais, estimamos perdas contábeis distribuídas pelos próximos 12 meses. Em contrapartida, teremos ganhos na operação, pois abasteceremos com combustível mais barato.
Com a entrada da TAM na Star Alliance, há a sensação de que a companhia tenta se transformar na antiga Varig. É isso?
Barioni – É um fato. Estamos crescendo em cima de um espaço deixado, como qualquer concorrente faria. Com a saída da Varig, em 2006, abriu-se uma janela muito importante para crescimento em vôos internacionais. São 154 vôos permitidos, e só fazemos 50.
O que o senhor acha das medidas da Anac para aumentar a concorrência, como liberdade tarifária para vôos internacionais?
Barioni – Somos a favor. Para que isso ocorra, no entanto, é preciso fazer a lição de casa porque a carga tributária para nós é de até 62%, enquanto para empresas de fora o custo é de 30%. Não temos nenhum problema com a concorrência, desde que as ferramentas sejam as mesmas.
Não é ruim que a Anac esteja aumentando a concorrência?
Barioni – Concorrência é sempre bom. Somos uma empresa que só cresceu porque o mercado era livre. A TAM não teria crescido em um mercado fechado. Agora, faz parte do jogo democrático discutir as regras, e a Anac tem feito isso muito bem. Isso é uma decisão de País, não de empresa.
ALEXANDRE DE SANTI
Jornal A Notícia - Joiville
ENTREVISTA: DAVID BARIONI NETO/PRESIDENTE DA TAM
Executivo diz que a liberdade tarifária é importante para o setor, mas defende redução tributária
No ano passado, quando assumiu uma companhia abatida pelo maior acidente aéreo da história do País, ninguém imaginava que David Barioni Neto colocaria a TAM em velocidade de cruzeiro tão rapidamente. Trazido da Gol, a principal concorrente, Barioni assumiu a presidência da companhia em novembro e, de lá para cá, só trouxe boas notícias para os acionistas da empresa.
Como a TAM está se preparando para enfrentar a crise?
David Barioni Neto – Lidamos com problemas de petróleo, dólar, crise internacional. A aviação é muito sensível a qualquer crise porque é multifacetada. No momento, estamos mantendo o planejamento estratégico. A TAM tem operações de hedge de petróleo para 50% do consumo dos próximos 12 meses, ao preço médio de US$ 105 o barril. Mantido o preço do petróleo nos níveis atuais, estimamos perdas contábeis distribuídas pelos próximos 12 meses. Em contrapartida, teremos ganhos na operação, pois abasteceremos com combustível mais barato.
Com a entrada da TAM na Star Alliance, há a sensação de que a companhia tenta se transformar na antiga Varig. É isso?
Barioni – É um fato. Estamos crescendo em cima de um espaço deixado, como qualquer concorrente faria. Com a saída da Varig, em 2006, abriu-se uma janela muito importante para crescimento em vôos internacionais. São 154 vôos permitidos, e só fazemos 50.
O que o senhor acha das medidas da Anac para aumentar a concorrência, como liberdade tarifária para vôos internacionais?
Barioni – Somos a favor. Para que isso ocorra, no entanto, é preciso fazer a lição de casa porque a carga tributária para nós é de até 62%, enquanto para empresas de fora o custo é de 30%. Não temos nenhum problema com a concorrência, desde que as ferramentas sejam as mesmas.
Não é ruim que a Anac esteja aumentando a concorrência?
Barioni – Concorrência é sempre bom. Somos uma empresa que só cresceu porque o mercado era livre. A TAM não teria crescido em um mercado fechado. Agora, faz parte do jogo democrático discutir as regras, e a Anac tem feito isso muito bem. Isso é uma decisão de País, não de empresa.
ALEXANDRE DE SANTI
sexta-feira, 17 de outubro de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] Department of Justice to Host Antitrust Workshop on Airline Competition
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS215507+17-Oct-2008+PRN20081017
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division today announced it will host a one-day workshop on recent academic research into developments in airline antitrust and competition to mark the 30-year anniversary of airline deregulation in the United States.
The event, which is open to the public and the press, will be held on Thursday, Oct. 23, 2008. The workshop will be held from 9:00 am to 4:00 pm in the Horizon Room of the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center located at 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20004. The workshop will include a keynote lecture followed by three sessions of economic research paper presentations. Each research paper will be presented by an author of the paper. There will be no discussion at the workshop of any matter that is pending before the Department. The current schedule is as follows:
9:00am-10:00am Keynote Lecture
Speaker:Severin Borenstein, E.T. Grether Professor of Business Administration and Public Policy, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley; Director of the University of California Energy Institute; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Paper: "How Airline Markets Work...Or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry" by Severin Borenstein and Nancy Rose (Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Research Associate, NBER)
10:15am-12:00pm Session 1: Airline Competition, Financial Volatility and Recent Trends
Presenter: Panle Jia, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Faculty Research Fellow, NBER
Paper: "Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airline Industry" by Steven Berry (James Burrows Moffatt Professor of Economics, Yale University, and Research Associate, NBER) and Panle Jia
Presenter:Federico Ciliberto, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Paper: "Bankruptcy and Product-Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry" by Federico Ciliberto and Carola Schenone (Assistant Professor, Finance Area, McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia)
Presenter:Rene Kamita, Economist, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Paper: "Analyzing the Impact of Antitrust Immunity: Price Effects Following the Aloha-Hawaiian Antitrust Immunity Agreement" by Rene Kamita
1:15pm-2:30pm Session 2: Airline Competition, Airport Delays and Congestion
Presenter:Cliff Winston, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution
Paper: "Airline Delays: Can Airport Privatization Help?" by Cliff Winston and Steven Morrison (Professor, Department of Economics, Northeastern University)
Presenter:Jan Brueckner, Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine
Paper: "Price vs. Quantity-Based Approaches to Airport Congestion Management" by Jan Brueckner
2:45pm-4:00pm Session 3: Airline Competition, Entry and Potential Competition
Presenter:Abe Dunn, Economist, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Paper: "Do Low Quality Products Affect High Quality Entry? Multiproduct Firms and Nonstop Entry in Airline Markets" by Abe Dunn
Presenter:John Kwoka, Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Economics, Northeastern University
Paper: "Eliminating a Competitive Constraint: The Price Effect of Merging with a Potential Entrant in Airlines" by John Kwoka and Evgenia Shumilkina (PhD student and lecturer, Department of Economics, Northeastern University)
There is no fee for attendance and there is no preregistration. For admission to the workshop and to the Ronald Reagan Building, all attendees will be required to show a valid form of photo identification, such as a driver's license. Links to the research papers that will be presented at the workshop and information about the workshop can be found on the Antitrust Division's web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/airlines2008/index.htm.
SOURCE U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice, +1-202-514-2007, +1-202-514-1888 (TDD)
© Thomson Reuters 2009 All rights reserved
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division today announced it will host a one-day workshop on recent academic research into developments in airline antitrust and competition to mark the 30-year anniversary of airline deregulation in the United States.
The event, which is open to the public and the press, will be held on Thursday, Oct. 23, 2008. The workshop will be held from 9:00 am to 4:00 pm in the Horizon Room of the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center located at 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20004. The workshop will include a keynote lecture followed by three sessions of economic research paper presentations. Each research paper will be presented by an author of the paper. There will be no discussion at the workshop of any matter that is pending before the Department. The current schedule is as follows:
9:00am-10:00am Keynote Lecture
Speaker:Severin Borenstein, E.T. Grether Professor of Business Administration and Public Policy, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley; Director of the University of California Energy Institute; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Paper: "How Airline Markets Work...Or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry" by Severin Borenstein and Nancy Rose (Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Research Associate, NBER)
10:15am-12:00pm Session 1: Airline Competition, Financial Volatility and Recent Trends
Presenter: Panle Jia, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Faculty Research Fellow, NBER
Paper: "Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airline Industry" by Steven Berry (James Burrows Moffatt Professor of Economics, Yale University, and Research Associate, NBER) and Panle Jia
Presenter:Federico Ciliberto, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Virginia
Paper: "Bankruptcy and Product-Market Competition: Evidence from the Airline Industry" by Federico Ciliberto and Carola Schenone (Assistant Professor, Finance Area, McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia)
Presenter:Rene Kamita, Economist, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Paper: "Analyzing the Impact of Antitrust Immunity: Price Effects Following the Aloha-Hawaiian Antitrust Immunity Agreement" by Rene Kamita
1:15pm-2:30pm Session 2: Airline Competition, Airport Delays and Congestion
Presenter:Cliff Winston, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution
Paper: "Airline Delays: Can Airport Privatization Help?" by Cliff Winston and Steven Morrison (Professor, Department of Economics, Northeastern University)
Presenter:Jan Brueckner, Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine
Paper: "Price vs. Quantity-Based Approaches to Airport Congestion Management" by Jan Brueckner
2:45pm-4:00pm Session 3: Airline Competition, Entry and Potential Competition
Presenter:Abe Dunn, Economist, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Paper: "Do Low Quality Products Affect High Quality Entry? Multiproduct Firms and Nonstop Entry in Airline Markets" by Abe Dunn
Presenter:John Kwoka, Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Economics, Northeastern University
Paper: "Eliminating a Competitive Constraint: The Price Effect of Merging with a Potential Entrant in Airlines" by John Kwoka and Evgenia Shumilkina (PhD student and lecturer, Department of Economics, Northeastern University)
There is no fee for attendance and there is no preregistration. For admission to the workshop and to the Ronald Reagan Building, all attendees will be required to show a valid form of photo identification, such as a driver's license. Links to the research papers that will be presented at the workshop and information about the workshop can be found on the Antitrust Division's web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/airlines2008/index.htm.
SOURCE U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice, +1-202-514-2007, +1-202-514-1888 (TDD)
© Thomson Reuters 2009 All rights reserved
quinta-feira, 2 de outubro de 2008
FAA Airport Slot Auctions Illegal. Now What?
By Dave Demerjian Email Author
It’s not the most exciting news we’ve heard this week, but for those of us who fly regularly, it’s important.
Yesterday the Government Accountability Office (GAO) announced that the the Department of Transportation will not be allowed to auction off takeoff and landing slots at busy airports. It’s a blow to the FAA, which saw the auctions as a way to reduce the delays that choke New York area airports, and a win for airlines, which would have been forced to pay out of pocket for flying into and out of those airports during peak hours.
The airline industry was quick to congratulate the GAO for its stellar work. "Airlines applaud the clear and decisive opinion rendered by the GAO, which affirms what we have said all along — that the DOT slot auction is unlawful," said James May of the Air Transport Association (ATA), the industry’s big trade group. "We urge the FAA to put their focus and attention on increasing capacity and airspace redesign to make progress in actually reducing delays.
The ATA thinks the magic bullet is NextGen, an air traffic control system that would replace the current radar-based technology with GPS. The ATA says NextGen would track aircraft more accurately, freeing up airspace by allowing planes to fly closer together. Without it, May predicts that all hell will break loose, saying that "today’s capacity crunch in the Northeast will be a national crisis."
That’s all well and good, but the reality is that most of us won’t live to see the $15 billion system. After all, the treasury isn’t exactly drunk on money these days (see: Federal Bank Bailout, budget deficit, slumping tax revenue, etc.), and Congress can’t even pass a bill that properly funds the FAA.
Which is why the FAA proposed slot auctions at the three New York area airports. It figured that by forcing airlines to pay for taking off and landing at certain times, rather than just scheduling flights as they pleased, congestion could be moderately reduced. Not surprisingly, airlines and airports were against the idea, with the New Jersey Port Authority going so far as to say it would ignore any slot restrictions the FAA tried to put into place at the Newark Airport.
So now that the slot auction plan is dead, what’s next? With NextGen a generation away and congestion likely to grow despite recent flight cutbacks, something has to give. Some say better air traffic control staffing is the answer, but all the controllers in the world won’t solve the problem of too many planes competing for a finite amount of runway and air space.
While the government and the industry try to hammer out a long term solution for the congestion mess, something needs to be done in the short term. At this point, what it will be is anyone’s guess.
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2008/10/faa-not-allowed/
It’s not the most exciting news we’ve heard this week, but for those of us who fly regularly, it’s important.
Yesterday the Government Accountability Office (GAO) announced that the the Department of Transportation will not be allowed to auction off takeoff and landing slots at busy airports. It’s a blow to the FAA, which saw the auctions as a way to reduce the delays that choke New York area airports, and a win for airlines, which would have been forced to pay out of pocket for flying into and out of those airports during peak hours.
The airline industry was quick to congratulate the GAO for its stellar work. "Airlines applaud the clear and decisive opinion rendered by the GAO, which affirms what we have said all along — that the DOT slot auction is unlawful," said James May of the Air Transport Association (ATA), the industry’s big trade group. "We urge the FAA to put their focus and attention on increasing capacity and airspace redesign to make progress in actually reducing delays.
The ATA thinks the magic bullet is NextGen, an air traffic control system that would replace the current radar-based technology with GPS. The ATA says NextGen would track aircraft more accurately, freeing up airspace by allowing planes to fly closer together. Without it, May predicts that all hell will break loose, saying that "today’s capacity crunch in the Northeast will be a national crisis."
That’s all well and good, but the reality is that most of us won’t live to see the $15 billion system. After all, the treasury isn’t exactly drunk on money these days (see: Federal Bank Bailout, budget deficit, slumping tax revenue, etc.), and Congress can’t even pass a bill that properly funds the FAA.
Which is why the FAA proposed slot auctions at the three New York area airports. It figured that by forcing airlines to pay for taking off and landing at certain times, rather than just scheduling flights as they pleased, congestion could be moderately reduced. Not surprisingly, airlines and airports were against the idea, with the New Jersey Port Authority going so far as to say it would ignore any slot restrictions the FAA tried to put into place at the Newark Airport.
So now that the slot auction plan is dead, what’s next? With NextGen a generation away and congestion likely to grow despite recent flight cutbacks, something has to give. Some say better air traffic control staffing is the answer, but all the controllers in the world won’t solve the problem of too many planes competing for a finite amount of runway and air space.
While the government and the industry try to hammer out a long term solution for the congestion mess, something needs to be done in the short term. At this point, what it will be is anyone’s guess.
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2008/10/faa-not-allowed/
quarta-feira, 1 de outubro de 2008
GAO: FAA cannot auction flight slots
CNN, WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. aviation officials have no legal authority to auction off takeoff and landing slots at airports, a scheme the government devised to try to curb crippling traffic jams at major airports, congressional investigators said Tuesday.
The legal opinion from the Government Accountability Office comes amid a legal fight among airlines, airport operators and the Federal Aviation Administration over the Bush administration's plan to trim flight delays by auctioning off slots at New York City-area airports.
The opinion is another blow to Bush administration officials who hope to get their air traffic experiment off the ground before they leave office in four months.
"We conclude that FAA may not auction slots under its property disposition authority, user fee authority, or any other authority, and thus also may not retain or use proceeds of any such auctions," GAO general counsel Gary Kepplinger said in a letter to lawmakers who had sought the legal opinion.
The GAO's top lawyer concluded that for the first time in 40 years, the FAA claims it may assign airspace as its "property," but the laws covering the FAA were never written to include such a definition of property.
Transportation Department spokesman Brian Turmail said the GAO was unfamiliar with aviation law, and had little time to study it before reaching its conclusion.
"Should Congress give the agency an opportunity to conduct a more thorough review, we are confident that GAO will better understand both the validity and the effectiveness of our approach," Turmail said in a statement.
Don't Miss
A number of congressional lawmakers had requested the legal opinion as they tried to stop the FAA's limited tryout of a slot auction this fall at Newark-Liberty Airport.
"This once again shows that the DOT needs to put a stop to this ideological battle that would cause chaos at New York airports. The administration has tried to jam through a half-baked plan that can't even be implemented," said Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., one of the agency's biggest critics.
Transportation Secretary Mary Peters proposed the auction plan after widespread complaints last year about rampant flight delays across the country. The government says two out of three flights delayed 15 minutes or more were due to cascading backups beginning at one of the New York metropolitan area's three airports: Newark, John F. Kennedy, and LaGuardia.
Trying to fix the problem, the government imposed new limits on the airports and announced plans to auction off some takeoff and landing slots to control the crushing demand for time and space. By auctioning slots, the government reasons, market forces will help restrain such demand and make the system operate more efficiently.
Opponents sued.
Airlines and airports contend the auction proposal will add new costs and make a mess of day-to-day airport operations.
The government pressed ahead with a trial effort at Newark to auction off just two slots, but an internal FAA agency told them to wait.
An agency order lifting that stay was issued after the GAO legal finding Tuesday, meaning the agency can in theory proceed with its trial auction in Newark.
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TRAVEL/09/30/flight.delays/index.html
The legal opinion from the Government Accountability Office comes amid a legal fight among airlines, airport operators and the Federal Aviation Administration over the Bush administration's plan to trim flight delays by auctioning off slots at New York City-area airports.
The opinion is another blow to Bush administration officials who hope to get their air traffic experiment off the ground before they leave office in four months.
"We conclude that FAA may not auction slots under its property disposition authority, user fee authority, or any other authority, and thus also may not retain or use proceeds of any such auctions," GAO general counsel Gary Kepplinger said in a letter to lawmakers who had sought the legal opinion.
The GAO's top lawyer concluded that for the first time in 40 years, the FAA claims it may assign airspace as its "property," but the laws covering the FAA were never written to include such a definition of property.
Transportation Department spokesman Brian Turmail said the GAO was unfamiliar with aviation law, and had little time to study it before reaching its conclusion.
"Should Congress give the agency an opportunity to conduct a more thorough review, we are confident that GAO will better understand both the validity and the effectiveness of our approach," Turmail said in a statement.
Don't Miss
A number of congressional lawmakers had requested the legal opinion as they tried to stop the FAA's limited tryout of a slot auction this fall at Newark-Liberty Airport.
"This once again shows that the DOT needs to put a stop to this ideological battle that would cause chaos at New York airports. The administration has tried to jam through a half-baked plan that can't even be implemented," said Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., one of the agency's biggest critics.
Transportation Secretary Mary Peters proposed the auction plan after widespread complaints last year about rampant flight delays across the country. The government says two out of three flights delayed 15 minutes or more were due to cascading backups beginning at one of the New York metropolitan area's three airports: Newark, John F. Kennedy, and LaGuardia.
Trying to fix the problem, the government imposed new limits on the airports and announced plans to auction off some takeoff and landing slots to control the crushing demand for time and space. By auctioning slots, the government reasons, market forces will help restrain such demand and make the system operate more efficiently.
Opponents sued.
Airlines and airports contend the auction proposal will add new costs and make a mess of day-to-day airport operations.
The government pressed ahead with a trial effort at Newark to auction off just two slots, but an internal FAA agency told them to wait.
An agency order lifting that stay was issued after the GAO legal finding Tuesday, meaning the agency can in theory proceed with its trial auction in Newark.
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TRAVEL/09/30/flight.delays/index.html
quarta-feira, 20 de agosto de 2008
BAA told to end UK monopoly by selling Gatwick and Stansted
By David Millward, Transport Editor
The Telegraph
The Competition Commission recommends BAA sells two of its three London airports, most probably Gatwick and Stansted
BAA has been told that it should sell two of its London airports by the Competition Commission.
As a result of the report BAA is likely to have to sell Stansted and Gatwick. Should it be unable to do so, then it could even be forced to surrender Heathrow.
The Commission's findings went further than expected with a further recommendation that the company should also sell either Glasgow or Edinburgh.
It will, however, be allowed to retain Aberdeen and Southampton airports.
In a withering report, the Commission said it had discovered "significant competition problems".
It added: "This has resulted in investment that is not tailored to the requirements of airport users and lower levels and quality of service for both airlines and passengers."
In addition the Commission has demanded that the Civil Aviation Authority tightens controls on airports, imposing tougher service standards.
BAA, which is owned by the Spanish group Ferrovial since, has faced attacks from airlines, politicians and business leaders over its stewardship of London's airports in particular.
These criticisms appear to have been endorsed by the Competition Commission.
The Commission's findings are provisional and still have to be confirmed. It is already clear that they will be fought hard by BAA.
In its report the Commission blamed BAA for the lack of runway and terminal capacity in the South East.
It says that it should have pressed for expansion sooner, but decided against doing so because its plans for one airport were influenced by its strategy for others in the region.
If Stansted, Gatwick and Heathrow were in competition, this would have been less likely to happen.
According to the Commission the common ownership of airports in London resulted in the distorting of competition between the airlines.
This was exacerbated by the prime position of Heathrow as a hub airport in the South East.
Heathrow regularly languishes at or near the bottom of performance tables produced by the Association of European Airlines.
Its shabbiness and the delays passengers face coming in and out of the country is regarded as having damaged the country's reputation.
Kitty Ussher, the City minister, said that "Heathrow hassle" was jeopardising the British economy and Ken Livingstone, the former London mayor, said the airport shamed the capital.
Heathrow reached its nadir earlier this year with the chaotic opening of the £4.3 billion Terminal 5.
The conclusions of the Commission were welcomed by BAA's critics, including Ryanair's Director of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, Jim Callaghan.
"Ryanair welcomes the Competition Commission's comprehensive report into the market power of the BAA monopoly and fully endorses its findings," he said.
"Competition works; monopolies don't. BAA's monopoly control over the London airports has been highly detrimental to competition and consumers.
"BAA has long ignored the needs of its airline users and the travelling public and provided inefficient, gold plated facilities, encouraged by an ineffectual regulator, the CAA."
Baroness Jo Valentine, Chief Executive of London First, also endorsed the conclusions.
"The Competition Commission's provisional findings today highlight one point loud and clear: passengers are being left at the back of a very long queue when it comes to interests served.
"Whatever options the Commission finally proposes, Heathrow will still be subject to the same out-dated regulation that has failed the passenger first time round.
"Introducing greater competition through selling off Gatwick or Stansted won't necessarily solve that conundrum - Heathrow will still be running to stand still, with too much demand for the airport to satisfy, and operating at 99pc capacity.
"Heathrow regulation needs a complete overhaul. Then and only then will better customer service mean putting the passenger interest first."
However the radical recommendations of the Competition Commission came under attack by Colin Matthews, BAA's chief executive.
"The Commission's findings state that the lack of runway capacity is a main reason for what it calls the current poor standards of service and the lack of resilience at times of disruption, which results in regular delays," he said
"By calling not just for a fundamental restructure of BAA but also for a review of the Government's Air Transport White Paper, the Commission risks delaying that delivery of new runways and making better customer service less, not more, likely.
"We will be seeking urgent clarification from the Government of how it believes this report's findings can be reconciled with the air transport policy it established in 2003 and its current review of economic regulation."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/2795040/BAA-told-to-end-UK-monopoly-by-selling-Gatwick-and-Stansted.html
The Telegraph
The Competition Commission recommends BAA sells two of its three London airports, most probably Gatwick and Stansted
BAA has been told that it should sell two of its London airports by the Competition Commission.
As a result of the report BAA is likely to have to sell Stansted and Gatwick. Should it be unable to do so, then it could even be forced to surrender Heathrow.
The Commission's findings went further than expected with a further recommendation that the company should also sell either Glasgow or Edinburgh.
It will, however, be allowed to retain Aberdeen and Southampton airports.
In a withering report, the Commission said it had discovered "significant competition problems".
It added: "This has resulted in investment that is not tailored to the requirements of airport users and lower levels and quality of service for both airlines and passengers."
In addition the Commission has demanded that the Civil Aviation Authority tightens controls on airports, imposing tougher service standards.
BAA, which is owned by the Spanish group Ferrovial since, has faced attacks from airlines, politicians and business leaders over its stewardship of London's airports in particular.
These criticisms appear to have been endorsed by the Competition Commission.
The Commission's findings are provisional and still have to be confirmed. It is already clear that they will be fought hard by BAA.
In its report the Commission blamed BAA for the lack of runway and terminal capacity in the South East.
It says that it should have pressed for expansion sooner, but decided against doing so because its plans for one airport were influenced by its strategy for others in the region.
If Stansted, Gatwick and Heathrow were in competition, this would have been less likely to happen.
According to the Commission the common ownership of airports in London resulted in the distorting of competition between the airlines.
This was exacerbated by the prime position of Heathrow as a hub airport in the South East.
Heathrow regularly languishes at or near the bottom of performance tables produced by the Association of European Airlines.
Its shabbiness and the delays passengers face coming in and out of the country is regarded as having damaged the country's reputation.
Kitty Ussher, the City minister, said that "Heathrow hassle" was jeopardising the British economy and Ken Livingstone, the former London mayor, said the airport shamed the capital.
Heathrow reached its nadir earlier this year with the chaotic opening of the £4.3 billion Terminal 5.
The conclusions of the Commission were welcomed by BAA's critics, including Ryanair's Director of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, Jim Callaghan.
"Ryanair welcomes the Competition Commission's comprehensive report into the market power of the BAA monopoly and fully endorses its findings," he said.
"Competition works; monopolies don't. BAA's monopoly control over the London airports has been highly detrimental to competition and consumers.
"BAA has long ignored the needs of its airline users and the travelling public and provided inefficient, gold plated facilities, encouraged by an ineffectual regulator, the CAA."
Baroness Jo Valentine, Chief Executive of London First, also endorsed the conclusions.
"The Competition Commission's provisional findings today highlight one point loud and clear: passengers are being left at the back of a very long queue when it comes to interests served.
"Whatever options the Commission finally proposes, Heathrow will still be subject to the same out-dated regulation that has failed the passenger first time round.
"Introducing greater competition through selling off Gatwick or Stansted won't necessarily solve that conundrum - Heathrow will still be running to stand still, with too much demand for the airport to satisfy, and operating at 99pc capacity.
"Heathrow regulation needs a complete overhaul. Then and only then will better customer service mean putting the passenger interest first."
However the radical recommendations of the Competition Commission came under attack by Colin Matthews, BAA's chief executive.
"The Commission's findings state that the lack of runway capacity is a main reason for what it calls the current poor standards of service and the lack of resilience at times of disruption, which results in regular delays," he said
"By calling not just for a fundamental restructure of BAA but also for a review of the Government's Air Transport White Paper, the Commission risks delaying that delivery of new runways and making better customer service less, not more, likely.
"We will be seeking urgent clarification from the Government of how it believes this report's findings can be reconciled with the air transport policy it established in 2003 and its current review of economic regulation."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/2795040/BAA-told-to-end-UK-monopoly-by-selling-Gatwick-and-Stansted.html
segunda-feira, 18 de agosto de 2008
Southwest Filing Fares in ATPCO Once Again
Southwest Filing Fares in ATPCO Once Again
By Brett Snyder | August 18, 2008
http://www.bnet.com/blog/airline-business/southwest-filing-fares-in-atpco-once-again/208
I can’t believe I missed this one. Southwest Airlines has once again begun filing fares in ATPCO. For other airlines, this is a joyous occasion, and for Southwest, it’s just a necessary evil. So what exactly is ATPCO and why does it matter?
ATPCO is the Airline Tariff Publishing Company. It’s a central clearinghouse where nearly all airlines file their fares, because it provides standardized distribution throughout the world. All reservation systems take the ATPCO feed and that’s how they receive most of their pricing information. If airlines don’t participate in reservation systems, this isn’t nearly as important, and that’s why Southwest pulled out several years ago.
It’s not just the reservation systems that get the fare feeds from ATPCO. The airlines do as well, and that’s a way for them to keep on top of the competitive situation in their markets. Three times a day domestically (once a day on weekends), new fares come flooding in and every airline pricing department analyzes the moves of other airlines to see what has happened.
When Southwest pulled out of the system, it scared the heck out of everyone, because there was no longer an easy way to see what Southwest was doing. Sure, you could go look at Southwest’s website and you could monitor their fare sale emails, but that was about it. In recent times, it has appeared to me that this left many airlines to overcompensate with low fares just to make sure that they were competitive over a broad area when in fact, they were often casting that net too wide.
Now that Southwest has come back in, it should mean that airlines can set their pricing with a bit more pinpoint accuracy. True, they still don’t have private web fares available for them, so there won’t be 100% visibility, but it’s going to help. Why would Southwest do something to aid the competition? Spokesperson Paula Berg says:
We started filing fares with ATPCO in April of this year. Getting ready for future codeshare partners necessitated the move back to ATPCO (industry standard fare filings).
Ah yes, codesharing. That’s another big benefit of having a centralized, standardized clearinghouse like ATPCO. It makes things like codesharing much easier to accomplish. So, this is good for Southwest, but it’s also good for the competition to be able to have a more accurate picture of the pricing landscape in the domestic world.
By Brett Snyder | August 18, 2008
http://www.bnet.com/blog/airline-business/southwest-filing-fares-in-atpco-once-again/208
I can’t believe I missed this one. Southwest Airlines has once again begun filing fares in ATPCO. For other airlines, this is a joyous occasion, and for Southwest, it’s just a necessary evil. So what exactly is ATPCO and why does it matter?
ATPCO is the Airline Tariff Publishing Company. It’s a central clearinghouse where nearly all airlines file their fares, because it provides standardized distribution throughout the world. All reservation systems take the ATPCO feed and that’s how they receive most of their pricing information. If airlines don’t participate in reservation systems, this isn’t nearly as important, and that’s why Southwest pulled out several years ago.
It’s not just the reservation systems that get the fare feeds from ATPCO. The airlines do as well, and that’s a way for them to keep on top of the competitive situation in their markets. Three times a day domestically (once a day on weekends), new fares come flooding in and every airline pricing department analyzes the moves of other airlines to see what has happened.
When Southwest pulled out of the system, it scared the heck out of everyone, because there was no longer an easy way to see what Southwest was doing. Sure, you could go look at Southwest’s website and you could monitor their fare sale emails, but that was about it. In recent times, it has appeared to me that this left many airlines to overcompensate with low fares just to make sure that they were competitive over a broad area when in fact, they were often casting that net too wide.
Now that Southwest has come back in, it should mean that airlines can set their pricing with a bit more pinpoint accuracy. True, they still don’t have private web fares available for them, so there won’t be 100% visibility, but it’s going to help. Why would Southwest do something to aid the competition? Spokesperson Paula Berg says:
We started filing fares with ATPCO in April of this year. Getting ready for future codeshare partners necessitated the move back to ATPCO (industry standard fare filings).
Ah yes, codesharing. That’s another big benefit of having a centralized, standardized clearinghouse like ATPCO. It makes things like codesharing much easier to accomplish. So, this is good for Southwest, but it’s also good for the competition to be able to have a more accurate picture of the pricing landscape in the domestic world.
segunda-feira, 11 de agosto de 2008
ATA Sues FAA To Stop Newark Slot Auction Plan
August 11, 2008 - 12:00 AM ET
The Air Transport Association today filed a lawsuit against the Federal Aviation Administration for the government's plan to auction slots at Newark Liberty International Airport.
ATA filed suit today in the U.S. Appeals Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to preclude FAA from carrying out the auction plan, which it claims is illegal since the "slots are not FAA property and cannot be auctioned by FAA," court documents said.
FAA last week released the auction notice to carriers, requesting them to submit bids for the slots by Sept. 3. The U.S. Department of Transportation, which oversees FAA, said the daily arrival and daily departure slot initially was allocated for Eos Airlines. The airline folded this year, "leaving FAA with control of the slots."
However, the move last week drew criticism from the airlines, the New York-area airport authority and ATA. "FAA's plan is not only unlawful, it is both surprising and perplexing," ATA president and CEO James May said in a statement today. "It is surprising because the end result will be more flights during the busiest times of the day at Newark, even as we suffer through yet another delay-plagued summer, and it is perplexing because the announced slot auction precedes formal rules to auction slots at Newark and other airports."
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey last week also said it planned to block any FAA efforts to auction slots.
Department of Transportation Secretary Mary Peters last week, in announcing the slot auction, said the plan allows FAA to initiate a market-driven approach for carriers to purchase the slot at its perceived value. DOT said it plans to use the funds generated from the auction "to reduce delays and enhance capacity at New York-area airports."
The Air Transport Association today filed a lawsuit against the Federal Aviation Administration for the government's plan to auction slots at Newark Liberty International Airport.
ATA filed suit today in the U.S. Appeals Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to preclude FAA from carrying out the auction plan, which it claims is illegal since the "slots are not FAA property and cannot be auctioned by FAA," court documents said.
FAA last week released the auction notice to carriers, requesting them to submit bids for the slots by Sept. 3. The U.S. Department of Transportation, which oversees FAA, said the daily arrival and daily departure slot initially was allocated for Eos Airlines. The airline folded this year, "leaving FAA with control of the slots."
However, the move last week drew criticism from the airlines, the New York-area airport authority and ATA. "FAA's plan is not only unlawful, it is both surprising and perplexing," ATA president and CEO James May said in a statement today. "It is surprising because the end result will be more flights during the busiest times of the day at Newark, even as we suffer through yet another delay-plagued summer, and it is perplexing because the announced slot auction precedes formal rules to auction slots at Newark and other airports."
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey last week also said it planned to block any FAA efforts to auction slots.
Department of Transportation Secretary Mary Peters last week, in announcing the slot auction, said the plan allows FAA to initiate a market-driven approach for carriers to purchase the slot at its perceived value. DOT said it plans to use the funds generated from the auction "to reduce delays and enhance capacity at New York-area airports."
segunda-feira, 30 de junho de 2008
Airlines try to hedge oil costs to stay in business
Published: Monday, June 30, 2008
NYTimes
DALLAS — The computer screen on Scott Topping's desk at Southwest Airlines flickered with row after row of dates and numbers, but they had nothing to do with arrivals and departures.
They tracked the price of oil futures for the next several months, and they told a grim tale: No letup in sight from record prices for jet fuel.
"We're on a one-way street right now," Topping said as he hunched over the screen, shaking his head.
It is Topping's job to oversee Southwest's battle to control surging fuel costs. It is the most successful program of its kind in the airline industry.
In the first quarter of this year, Southwest paid $1.98 per gallon for fuel. American Airlines paid $2.73, and United paid $2.83 per gallon in the same period.
Since 1999, hedging has saved Southwest $3.5 billion. It has sometimes meant the difference between profit and loss. In the first quarter, hedging gains of $291 million dwarfed Southwest's $34 million profit.
Hedging is a financial strategy that lets airlines or other investors protect themselves against rising prices for commodities like oil by locking in a price for fuel. It has been described as everything from gambling to buying insurance.
Airlines can hedge in several ways, making financial transactions with banks, energy companies or other trading partners.
They can buy contracts for crude oil or unleaded gasoline, and reap a gain if prices rise, offsetting the higher cost of jet fuel.
They can buy a "call option" that gives them the right to buy fuel at a certain price.
They can also use collar hedges, a combination of rights to buy and sell at set prices ("call" and "put" options). Collars provide protection from a decline in prices but less upside if prices rise.
Airlines also use swaps, contracts that require them to buy oil or fuel on a certain date at a set price. These are risky - one party in a swap wins, the other loses.
Most airlines use a combination of strategies to reduce risk.
The transactions carry a price tag. Southwest spent $52 million on hedging premiums last year and $14 million in the first three months of this year.
As a result mostly of trades made years ago, Southwest has hedged 70 percent of this year's fuel needs at $51 per barrel instead of the current price of more than $140 per barrel.
But hedging premiums rise and fall with the price of the underlying commodity, making new trades very expensive. Southwest has not done much trading in the last several months.
Airline executives say hedging is not a bet on the direction of oil prices.
"We view our program as insurance," said Paul Jacobson, the treasurer of Delta Air Lines Inc. "Our goal is to minimize the volatility of fuel expenses. To do that, you've got to be in the market actively without an opinion as to what energy prices will do."
But hedging carries risks. Airlines can lose money if oil prices turn down and their options expire.
In 2006, Delta won approval from a bankruptcy court and creditors to get into hedging. But the airline got squeezed when oil prices dropped in midyear, and it reported a loss of $108 million from the trading.
Continental Airlines Inc. reported a loss of $18 million from hedging in the first quarter of 2007. But like Delta, Continental is still hedging.
At one time in the 1990s, most major U.S. airlines hedged some of their fuel costs - even hiring experts from the oil industry to show them the ropes - said Peter Fusaro, chairman of Global Change Associates, an adviser to hedge funds.
That changed after the recession and terror attacks of 2001, which plunged airlines into huge losses. Banks and energy companies that make hedging trades with airlines grew nervous.
"The problem was that most carriers had terrible creditworthiness and couldn't hedge," Fusaro said.
"Counter-parties feared the carriers would renege on their trades."
Southwest was the only large U.S. carrier to remain profitable through the downturn. It benefited from higher labor productivity and lower ticket-sales costs. That, and a healthy balance sheet, allowed it to keep hedging when oil was a bargain, compared to today's prices.
Now, Southwest is the only big carrier that has most of its fuel expenses hedged at below-market prices. And analysts say it will be the only one to earn a profit this year.
While other carriers plan to slash flights later this year - some contracting by more than 10 percent - Southwest expects to grow, although more slowly than it would like.
And Southwest has avoided the kind of fees that annoy passengers. It doesn't charge for checking luggage or buying a ticket over the phone, doesn't add a fuel surcharge to the fare, and still gives out free sodas and snacks.
But how long will the joy ride last?
The bulk of Southwest's hedges expire gradually by 2012.
Replacing them would be very expensive and risky. One plan under study is to go back to hedging only against catastrophically higher oil prices - say, $200 per barrel.
Unless oil prices stabilize or even decline, the airline could face a crisis covering higher fuel costs in just a few years.
"It's starting to have an impact on their operating plan," said Betsy Snyder, an analyst for the debt-rating service Standard & Poor's. "They're cutting back growth plans for the first time ever and exiting some unprofitable routes."
Chairman and Chief Executive Gary Kelly said the fuel hedges have bought his airline time to adjust to higher energy costs. Now he wants to find $1.5 billion in new revenue to make up for shrinking fuel hedges.
Among possible sources of the money are higher fares, international service, in-flight entertainment for a charge, and selling hotel rooms on its Web site.
Snyder thinks Southwest can pull it off by following its current strategy of expansion in places like Denver, Philadelphia and Baltimore, where rivals are cutting flights.
"This is a company," Snyder said, "that has always taken advantage of others' misfortune."
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-30hedge.14104427.html?_r=1
Published: Monday, June 30, 2008
NYTimes
DALLAS — The computer screen on Scott Topping's desk at Southwest Airlines flickered with row after row of dates and numbers, but they had nothing to do with arrivals and departures.
They tracked the price of oil futures for the next several months, and they told a grim tale: No letup in sight from record prices for jet fuel.
"We're on a one-way street right now," Topping said as he hunched over the screen, shaking his head.
It is Topping's job to oversee Southwest's battle to control surging fuel costs. It is the most successful program of its kind in the airline industry.
In the first quarter of this year, Southwest paid $1.98 per gallon for fuel. American Airlines paid $2.73, and United paid $2.83 per gallon in the same period.
Since 1999, hedging has saved Southwest $3.5 billion. It has sometimes meant the difference between profit and loss. In the first quarter, hedging gains of $291 million dwarfed Southwest's $34 million profit.
Hedging is a financial strategy that lets airlines or other investors protect themselves against rising prices for commodities like oil by locking in a price for fuel. It has been described as everything from gambling to buying insurance.
Airlines can hedge in several ways, making financial transactions with banks, energy companies or other trading partners.
They can buy contracts for crude oil or unleaded gasoline, and reap a gain if prices rise, offsetting the higher cost of jet fuel.
They can buy a "call option" that gives them the right to buy fuel at a certain price.
They can also use collar hedges, a combination of rights to buy and sell at set prices ("call" and "put" options). Collars provide protection from a decline in prices but less upside if prices rise.
Airlines also use swaps, contracts that require them to buy oil or fuel on a certain date at a set price. These are risky - one party in a swap wins, the other loses.
Most airlines use a combination of strategies to reduce risk.
The transactions carry a price tag. Southwest spent $52 million on hedging premiums last year and $14 million in the first three months of this year.
As a result mostly of trades made years ago, Southwest has hedged 70 percent of this year's fuel needs at $51 per barrel instead of the current price of more than $140 per barrel.
But hedging premiums rise and fall with the price of the underlying commodity, making new trades very expensive. Southwest has not done much trading in the last several months.
Airline executives say hedging is not a bet on the direction of oil prices.
"We view our program as insurance," said Paul Jacobson, the treasurer of Delta Air Lines Inc. "Our goal is to minimize the volatility of fuel expenses. To do that, you've got to be in the market actively without an opinion as to what energy prices will do."
But hedging carries risks. Airlines can lose money if oil prices turn down and their options expire.
In 2006, Delta won approval from a bankruptcy court and creditors to get into hedging. But the airline got squeezed when oil prices dropped in midyear, and it reported a loss of $108 million from the trading.
Continental Airlines Inc. reported a loss of $18 million from hedging in the first quarter of 2007. But like Delta, Continental is still hedging.
At one time in the 1990s, most major U.S. airlines hedged some of their fuel costs - even hiring experts from the oil industry to show them the ropes - said Peter Fusaro, chairman of Global Change Associates, an adviser to hedge funds.
That changed after the recession and terror attacks of 2001, which plunged airlines into huge losses. Banks and energy companies that make hedging trades with airlines grew nervous.
"The problem was that most carriers had terrible creditworthiness and couldn't hedge," Fusaro said.
"Counter-parties feared the carriers would renege on their trades."
Southwest was the only large U.S. carrier to remain profitable through the downturn. It benefited from higher labor productivity and lower ticket-sales costs. That, and a healthy balance sheet, allowed it to keep hedging when oil was a bargain, compared to today's prices.
Now, Southwest is the only big carrier that has most of its fuel expenses hedged at below-market prices. And analysts say it will be the only one to earn a profit this year.
While other carriers plan to slash flights later this year - some contracting by more than 10 percent - Southwest expects to grow, although more slowly than it would like.
And Southwest has avoided the kind of fees that annoy passengers. It doesn't charge for checking luggage or buying a ticket over the phone, doesn't add a fuel surcharge to the fare, and still gives out free sodas and snacks.
But how long will the joy ride last?
The bulk of Southwest's hedges expire gradually by 2012.
Replacing them would be very expensive and risky. One plan under study is to go back to hedging only against catastrophically higher oil prices - say, $200 per barrel.
Unless oil prices stabilize or even decline, the airline could face a crisis covering higher fuel costs in just a few years.
"It's starting to have an impact on their operating plan," said Betsy Snyder, an analyst for the debt-rating service Standard & Poor's. "They're cutting back growth plans for the first time ever and exiting some unprofitable routes."
Chairman and Chief Executive Gary Kelly said the fuel hedges have bought his airline time to adjust to higher energy costs. Now he wants to find $1.5 billion in new revenue to make up for shrinking fuel hedges.
Among possible sources of the money are higher fares, international service, in-flight entertainment for a charge, and selling hotel rooms on its Web site.
Snyder thinks Southwest can pull it off by following its current strategy of expansion in places like Denver, Philadelphia and Baltimore, where rivals are cutting flights.
"This is a company," Snyder said, "that has always taken advantage of others' misfortune."
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-30hedge.14104427.html?_r=1
sábado, 28 de junho de 2008
Fuel Prices Ground Flights From Hartford To Europe
A situação de Hartford com relacao aos voos, vide abaixo, é muitíssimo parecida com São José dos Campos. Vejam q o aeroporto e a localidade fizeram uma proposta de 650 mil dolares!
By ERIC GERSHON | Courant Staff Writer
June 28, 2008
The decision by Northwest Airlines to cancel its year-old flight between Hartford and Amsterdam squashes what Connecticut leaders hailed as a dream come true, a path to Europe that went beyond travel to stimulate commerce with the rest of the world.
Launched with great hoopla last July 1, the flight was the first nonstop transatlantic route to Europe from Bradley International Airport in decades. It ends Oct. 2.
The news from Northwest, posted on its website late Thursday and confirmed Friday, came less than 48 hours after Delta Air Lines said it would cut its Bradley to Los Angles route, Connecticut's only nonstop connection to the West Coast.
Both airlines cited overwhelming fuel costs as the sole reason for ending the flights. Delta and Northwest are merging, but both said that was not a factor.
Suddenly, as regional airports around the nation face service cutbacks, the Hartford region loses its only direct flights to crucial, distant points. The one-two punch underscores the region's tenuous position in the global competition for economic development and reflects the airline industry's circumstances as oil tops $140 a barrel.
"It's a step backwards," said Oz Griebel, president of the MetroHartford Alliance, the regional chamber of commerce. "There's no way to sugarcoat it."
The Amsterdam flight was the newer of the two vanishing routes, and it served as a greater selling point for people trying to pitch Hartford as a place worth being, he said.
"As important as L.A. is," Griebel said, "there's a little bit of magic in being able to say you can get nonstop service to Europe."
Hopes were high that the flights, especially the Amsterdam route, would generate not just buzz but business activity. It's hard to measure how much economic benefit has actually happened, especially given the short duration of Northwest's service to Europe.
Northwest would not release any information about the popularity or profitability of its Hartford-Amsterdam flight, but a spokeswoman expressed confidence in market demand for the route and blamed fuel prices entirely.
"Under more reasonable fuel prices, this flight was building the kind of market that makes for a successful route," said spokeswoman Michelle Aguayo Shannon.
Bradley and regional officials offered an incentive package worth $650,000 to keep the flight alive, said Kiran Jain, Bradley's director of route development and the person perhaps most responsible for bringing Amsterdam service to Hartford. The airline refused, she said. Northwest had no comment on the offer.
The 160-seat 757s Northwest has been flying on the route are frequently 80 percent full or better, except in the winter months, Jain said.
ING, the Dutch financial services firm that employs about 2,000 people in Greater Hartford, regularly put executives on the Amsterdam flight, spokesman Philip Margolis said Friday, but not every day. Most ING employees in the area never visit the corporation's world headquarters outside Amsterdam.
"Most people can see that this is reflective of a much broader industry issue," Margolis said, referring to the airline industry's struggle to manage rising fuel prices.
But hope for the flight was based less on direct access to Amsterdam than on the access the city's busy Schiphol Airport would provide. From Schiphol, travelers can fly directly to scores of cities in Europe, Asia and Africa.
For Hartford-based United Technologies Corp., which touts the global footprint of its operations and frequently sends employees overseas, the Amsterdam flight helped minimize travel time by eliminating trips to airports in Boston and New York. UTC, which sent a public relations team to Bradley for the launch of the Amsterdam service, did not comment on the flight's demise.
After Oct. 2, Connecticut travelers will probably again drive to Boston or New York for transatlantic flights. Or they'll board in Bradley and connect in another U.S. city to fly overseas.
Gov. M. Jodi Rell's spokesman issued a statement saying, "As soon as fuel prices show any sign of stabilizing, Bradley Airport's route development team will be speaking with transatlantic carriers again."
"Everything looks great from our side," said Jain. "But we're not responsible for operating a fleet of 757s and making sure that each and every one of them is profitable."
Contact Eric Gershon at egershon@courant.com.
By ERIC GERSHON | Courant Staff Writer
June 28, 2008
The decision by Northwest Airlines to cancel its year-old flight between Hartford and Amsterdam squashes what Connecticut leaders hailed as a dream come true, a path to Europe that went beyond travel to stimulate commerce with the rest of the world.
Launched with great hoopla last July 1, the flight was the first nonstop transatlantic route to Europe from Bradley International Airport in decades. It ends Oct. 2.
The news from Northwest, posted on its website late Thursday and confirmed Friday, came less than 48 hours after Delta Air Lines said it would cut its Bradley to Los Angles route, Connecticut's only nonstop connection to the West Coast.
Both airlines cited overwhelming fuel costs as the sole reason for ending the flights. Delta and Northwest are merging, but both said that was not a factor.
Suddenly, as regional airports around the nation face service cutbacks, the Hartford region loses its only direct flights to crucial, distant points. The one-two punch underscores the region's tenuous position in the global competition for economic development and reflects the airline industry's circumstances as oil tops $140 a barrel.
"It's a step backwards," said Oz Griebel, president of the MetroHartford Alliance, the regional chamber of commerce. "There's no way to sugarcoat it."
The Amsterdam flight was the newer of the two vanishing routes, and it served as a greater selling point for people trying to pitch Hartford as a place worth being, he said.
"As important as L.A. is," Griebel said, "there's a little bit of magic in being able to say you can get nonstop service to Europe."
Hopes were high that the flights, especially the Amsterdam route, would generate not just buzz but business activity. It's hard to measure how much economic benefit has actually happened, especially given the short duration of Northwest's service to Europe.
Northwest would not release any information about the popularity or profitability of its Hartford-Amsterdam flight, but a spokeswoman expressed confidence in market demand for the route and blamed fuel prices entirely.
"Under more reasonable fuel prices, this flight was building the kind of market that makes for a successful route," said spokeswoman Michelle Aguayo Shannon.
Bradley and regional officials offered an incentive package worth $650,000 to keep the flight alive, said Kiran Jain, Bradley's director of route development and the person perhaps most responsible for bringing Amsterdam service to Hartford. The airline refused, she said. Northwest had no comment on the offer.
The 160-seat 757s Northwest has been flying on the route are frequently 80 percent full or better, except in the winter months, Jain said.
ING, the Dutch financial services firm that employs about 2,000 people in Greater Hartford, regularly put executives on the Amsterdam flight, spokesman Philip Margolis said Friday, but not every day. Most ING employees in the area never visit the corporation's world headquarters outside Amsterdam.
"Most people can see that this is reflective of a much broader industry issue," Margolis said, referring to the airline industry's struggle to manage rising fuel prices.
But hope for the flight was based less on direct access to Amsterdam than on the access the city's busy Schiphol Airport would provide. From Schiphol, travelers can fly directly to scores of cities in Europe, Asia and Africa.
For Hartford-based United Technologies Corp., which touts the global footprint of its operations and frequently sends employees overseas, the Amsterdam flight helped minimize travel time by eliminating trips to airports in Boston and New York. UTC, which sent a public relations team to Bradley for the launch of the Amsterdam service, did not comment on the flight's demise.
After Oct. 2, Connecticut travelers will probably again drive to Boston or New York for transatlantic flights. Or they'll board in Bradley and connect in another U.S. city to fly overseas.
Gov. M. Jodi Rell's spokesman issued a statement saying, "As soon as fuel prices show any sign of stabilizing, Bradley Airport's route development team will be speaking with transatlantic carriers again."
"Everything looks great from our side," said Jain. "But we're not responsible for operating a fleet of 757s and making sure that each and every one of them is profitable."
Contact Eric Gershon at egershon@courant.com.
quinta-feira, 19 de junho de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] Trip vai financiar pedido firme de aviões da Embraer com leasing, mas estuda BNDES para opções
Valor On-line
19/06/2008
SÃO PAULO - Os cinco primeiros aviões adquiridos pela Trip Linhas Aéreas junto à Embraer deverão ser financiados com recursos externos, de empresas de leasing aeronáutico internacional. Para as opções e os direitos de compra, a companhia avalia outras alternativas, inclusive financiamentos oferecidos pelo Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), disse hoje seu presidente, José Mário Caprioli.
Agora vamos atrás do financiamento junto às empresas de leasing, mas os E-Jets (família de aviões da Embraer) são muito bem vistos no exterior, considerados bons ativos, por isso não deveremos ter problema em obter os recursos, afirmou Caprioli. A preços de tabela, esses cinco primeiros aviões, modelo EMB 175, têm valor conjunto de US$ 167,5 milhões.
Para as 10 opções e 15 direitos de compra, a estratégia é um pouco diferente. Segundo Caprioli, com um volume maior de recursos a serem captados para fechar esses negócios, a empresa deve buscar alternativas a apenas contratos de leasing.
Para os cinco primeiros a intenção é mesmo o leasing. Mas para os outros acordos, de 10 e 15 aviões, o BNDES começa a ser interessante, especialmente por ter produtos em reais, que podem ser relacionados às nossas receitas nessa moeda, afirma o executivo.
Durante o anúncio oficial da compra dos aviões da Embraer, Caprioli ainda comentou o atraso na liberação do financiamento de outro processo de aquisição de aeronaves, fechado no fim de 2006. Na época, a companhia adquiriu 7 ATRs e opções para outros cinco. Segundo ele, houve um atraso de cerca de dois meses na liberação do financiamento, uma vez que, com a compra da Total, as empresas que concederam os recursos tiveram que rever o crédito da companhia. Mas inclusive já confirmamos até mesmo as opções e, hoje, o financiamento de todas as aeronaves já está fechado. A primeira será entregue na semana que vem e a segunda, dez dias depois, afirmou. No total, a compra desses 12 aviões representa um investimento (a preços de tabela) de US$ 200 milhões.
(José Sergio Osse | Valor Online)
19/06/2008
SÃO PAULO - Os cinco primeiros aviões adquiridos pela Trip Linhas Aéreas junto à Embraer deverão ser financiados com recursos externos, de empresas de leasing aeronáutico internacional. Para as opções e os direitos de compra, a companhia avalia outras alternativas, inclusive financiamentos oferecidos pelo Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), disse hoje seu presidente, José Mário Caprioli.
Agora vamos atrás do financiamento junto às empresas de leasing, mas os E-Jets (família de aviões da Embraer) são muito bem vistos no exterior, considerados bons ativos, por isso não deveremos ter problema em obter os recursos, afirmou Caprioli. A preços de tabela, esses cinco primeiros aviões, modelo EMB 175, têm valor conjunto de US$ 167,5 milhões.
Para as 10 opções e 15 direitos de compra, a estratégia é um pouco diferente. Segundo Caprioli, com um volume maior de recursos a serem captados para fechar esses negócios, a empresa deve buscar alternativas a apenas contratos de leasing.
Para os cinco primeiros a intenção é mesmo o leasing. Mas para os outros acordos, de 10 e 15 aviões, o BNDES começa a ser interessante, especialmente por ter produtos em reais, que podem ser relacionados às nossas receitas nessa moeda, afirma o executivo.
Durante o anúncio oficial da compra dos aviões da Embraer, Caprioli ainda comentou o atraso na liberação do financiamento de outro processo de aquisição de aeronaves, fechado no fim de 2006. Na época, a companhia adquiriu 7 ATRs e opções para outros cinco. Segundo ele, houve um atraso de cerca de dois meses na liberação do financiamento, uma vez que, com a compra da Total, as empresas que concederam os recursos tiveram que rever o crédito da companhia. Mas inclusive já confirmamos até mesmo as opções e, hoje, o financiamento de todas as aeronaves já está fechado. A primeira será entregue na semana que vem e a segunda, dez dias depois, afirmou. No total, a compra desses 12 aviões representa um investimento (a preços de tabela) de US$ 200 milhões.
(José Sergio Osse | Valor Online)
sábado, 7 de junho de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] Empresas áreas unidas são multadas por cartel unidas
Fonte: http://www.quidnovi.com.br/fm_noticia.php?id=1810
As empresas aéreas TAM, Varig, VASP e Transbrasil foram multadas por praticarem cartel na ponte aérea Rio-São Paulo. O Juiz da 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Brasília, Pablo Zuniga Dourado, proferiu nesta sexta-feira, 6, hoje sentença confirmando a decisão do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa do Consumidor (Cade), que condenou VARIG, TAM, VASP e TRANSBRASIL por fazerem cartel na rota Santos Dumont/Congonhas em agosto de 1999.
O Cade havia apurado que, uma semana após a realização de uma reunião entre seus dirigentes, referidas empresas aéreas reajustaram de forma linear e uniforme os preços das passagens em 10%. Por isso, aplicou multas no valor de R$ 633.695,04 (TAM), R$ 3.213.214,42 (VARIG).
A TAM e a VARIG ingressaram com duas ações na Seção Judiciária do Distrito Federal. Ao julgar pela improcedência dos pleitos, o Juiz da 3ª Vara Federal considerou que: "andou bem a autoridade antitruste quando entendeu se constituir indício a reunião realizada pelas empresas aéreas. É dizer: não é a aritmética quem dirá acerca da existência ou não de práticas anticoncorrenciais, mas os efeitos das condutas comerciais dos agentes inseridos no mesmo mercado relevante geográfico e material". Ao final, concluiu o Juiz que: "as provas dos autos em conjunto, levam à inevitável conclusão de que os autores fizeram acordos horizontais a fim de fixar preços uniformes. Construíram cartel e prejudicaram os consumidores."
"Empresas concorrentes não podem combinar preços ou quaisquer estratégias comerciais. Quando isso ocorre, os consumidores são roubados, postos de trabalhos deixam de ser criados e o país diminui o crescimento" afirmou o Procurador-Geral do Cade, Arthur Badin. "A decisão judicial renova nossa convicção de que o Poder Judiciário tem um papel importantíssimo na implementação da política antitruste, sobretudo quando desincentiva tentativas de reverter decisões tecnicamente irreprováveis do Cade", completou. As informações são do Cade. (Maurício Nogueira)
As empresas aéreas TAM, Varig, VASP e Transbrasil foram multadas por praticarem cartel na ponte aérea Rio-São Paulo. O Juiz da 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Brasília, Pablo Zuniga Dourado, proferiu nesta sexta-feira, 6, hoje sentença confirmando a decisão do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa do Consumidor (Cade), que condenou VARIG, TAM, VASP e TRANSBRASIL por fazerem cartel na rota Santos Dumont/Congonhas em agosto de 1999.
O Cade havia apurado que, uma semana após a realização de uma reunião entre seus dirigentes, referidas empresas aéreas reajustaram de forma linear e uniforme os preços das passagens em 10%. Por isso, aplicou multas no valor de R$ 633.695,04 (TAM), R$ 3.213.214,42 (VARIG).
A TAM e a VARIG ingressaram com duas ações na Seção Judiciária do Distrito Federal. Ao julgar pela improcedência dos pleitos, o Juiz da 3ª Vara Federal considerou que: "andou bem a autoridade antitruste quando entendeu se constituir indício a reunião realizada pelas empresas aéreas. É dizer: não é a aritmética quem dirá acerca da existência ou não de práticas anticoncorrenciais, mas os efeitos das condutas comerciais dos agentes inseridos no mesmo mercado relevante geográfico e material". Ao final, concluiu o Juiz que: "as provas dos autos em conjunto, levam à inevitável conclusão de que os autores fizeram acordos horizontais a fim de fixar preços uniformes. Construíram cartel e prejudicaram os consumidores."
"Empresas concorrentes não podem combinar preços ou quaisquer estratégias comerciais. Quando isso ocorre, os consumidores são roubados, postos de trabalhos deixam de ser criados e o país diminui o crescimento" afirmou o Procurador-Geral do Cade, Arthur Badin. "A decisão judicial renova nossa convicção de que o Poder Judiciário tem um papel importantíssimo na implementação da política antitruste, sobretudo quando desincentiva tentativas de reverter decisões tecnicamente irreprováveis do Cade", completou. As informações são do Cade. (Maurício Nogueira)
segunda-feira, 26 de maio de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] Allemander: "Diretores não entendem nada de aviação"
Publicada em 26/5/2008 12:14:00
Allemander Pereira Filho, ex-diretor da Anac, João Flávio Pedrosa, conselheiro da CNC, Trigueiros Jr., presidente do Conselho de Turismo da CNC, o juiz Luiz Roberto Ayoub, Eduardo Farah e Roseli Pimentel, ambos representando a Abav-RJ
A Organização Internacional de Aviação Civil (Oaci, na sigla em inglês) se prepara para uma nova auditoria do sistema de aviação civil do País. A avaliação será feita um maio de 2009, nove anos após a última, em 2000. O resultado da auditoria pode servir de base para medidas das autoridades norte-americanas e européias. Atualmente, o Brasil é classificado na categoria número 1, que é a melhor classificação da aviação civil internacional.
Segundo o brigadeiro Allemander Pereira Filho, ex-diretor da Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Anac), a base de avaliação da Oaci era a Varig, que operava as linhas internacionais na época. “Hoje essa realidade mudou e quem opera a maioria das rotas internacionais é a Tam”, disse Allemander. A empresa deverá ser a base da avaliação da organização. Sem entrar em detalhes por ainda estar vinculado à Anac, Allemander avalia que o Brasil corre o risco de ser rebaixado na classificação internacional para a categoria 2, o que automaticamente congelaria novas freqüências para o Exterior. “E se formos para a categoria 3, não podemos sobrevoar esses territórios e os países passam a desaconselhar nossas empresas aos passageiros”, alertou. “Mas o problema não é a companhia aérea e nem seus serviços prestados (no caso da Tam)”, disse.
Por dedução lógica, os problemas poderiam ser relacionados à segurança do espaço aéreo, infra-estrutura aeroportuária e à regulamentação do setor. Pereira fez uma avaliação da Anac – da qual se desligou por não concordar com as posições da diretoria – e disse que a agência conta com quatro diretores “com excelente formação acadêmica, mas que não entendem nada de aviação”.
Allemander Pereira Filho participa de uma palestra realizada pelo movimento Asas da Paz, ligado à Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC), no Rio de Janeiro. Também participa como palestrante, o juíz Luiz Roberto Ayoub, responsável pelo processo de recuperação judicial da Varig, que falou sobre a nova Lei de Recuperação Empresarial, recurso utilizado pela primeira vez pela Varig. “A recuperação da Varig e sua manutenção, da forma como se dá, já pode ser considerada positiva. Visto que, com o seu quase desaparecimento, houve impactos no turismo e na economia do País”, disse Ayoub.
Segundo o brigadeiro Allemander Pereira Filho, ex-diretor da Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Anac), a base de avaliação da Oaci era a Varig, que operava as linhas internacionais na época. “Hoje essa realidade mudou e quem opera a maioria das rotas internacionais é a Tam”, disse Allemander. A empresa deverá ser a base da avaliação da organização. Sem entrar em detalhes por ainda estar vinculado à Anac, Allemander avalia que o Brasil corre o risco de ser rebaixado na classificação internacional para a categoria 2, o que automaticamente congelaria novas freqüências para o Exterior. “E se formos para a categoria 3, não podemos sobrevoar esses territórios e os países passam a desaconselhar nossas empresas aos passageiros”, alertou. “Mas o problema não é a companhia aérea e nem seus serviços prestados (no caso da Tam)”, disse.
Por dedução lógica, os problemas poderiam ser relacionados à segurança do espaço aéreo, infra-estrutura aeroportuária e à regulamentação do setor. Pereira fez uma avaliação da Anac – da qual se desligou por não concordar com as posições da diretoria – e disse que a agência conta com quatro diretores “com excelente formação acadêmica, mas que não entendem nada de aviação”.
Allemander Pereira Filho participa de uma palestra realizada pelo movimento Asas da Paz, ligado à Confederação Nacional do Comércio (CNC), no Rio de Janeiro. Também participa como palestrante, o juíz Luiz Roberto Ayoub, responsável pelo processo de recuperação judicial da Varig, que falou sobre a nova Lei de Recuperação Empresarial, recurso utilizado pela primeira vez pela Varig. “A recuperação da Varig e sua manutenção, da forma como se dá, já pode ser considerada positiva. Visto que, com o seu quase desaparecimento, houve impactos no turismo e na economia do País”, disse Ayoub.
sexta-feira, 9 de maio de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] TAM e Varig são condenadas por cartel
Por Débora Pinho
Publicado em 09/05/2008 - 12:46
http://portalexame.abril.com.br/blogs/leisenegocios/listar20.shtml
A TAM e a Varig estão obrigadas a pagar multas por prática de cartel na ponte aérea Rio-São Paulo em agosto de 1999. As multas impostas às empresas pelo Cade (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) foram confirmadas pelo juiz da 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Brasília, Pablo Zuniga Dourado.
Os preços das passagens foram reajustados em 10% de forma uniforme na época. O Cade multou a TAM em 633 mil reais e a Varig em R$ 3,2 milhões de reais. Elas tentaram anular as multas judicialmente. Não conseguiram.
Para o juiz, há provas de que as empresas "fizeram acordos horizontais a fim de fixar preços uniformes. Construíram cartel e prejudicaram os consumidores". Tanto a Varig quanto a TAM podem recorrer para tentar derrubar a condenação.
Publicado em 09/05/2008 - 12:46
http://portalexame.abril.com.br/blogs/leisenegocios/listar20.shtml
A TAM e a Varig estão obrigadas a pagar multas por prática de cartel na ponte aérea Rio-São Paulo em agosto de 1999. As multas impostas às empresas pelo Cade (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica) foram confirmadas pelo juiz da 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Brasília, Pablo Zuniga Dourado.
Os preços das passagens foram reajustados em 10% de forma uniforme na época. O Cade multou a TAM em 633 mil reais e a Varig em R$ 3,2 milhões de reais. Elas tentaram anular as multas judicialmente. Não conseguiram.
Para o juiz, há provas de que as empresas "fizeram acordos horizontais a fim de fixar preços uniformes. Construíram cartel e prejudicaram os consumidores". Tanto a Varig quanto a TAM podem recorrer para tentar derrubar a condenação.
[Recordar é Viver] Justiça Federal confirma decisão do Cade que condenou o cartel das aéreas
09/05/2008
Fonte: Assessoria de Imprensa do Cade
O Juiz da 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Brasília, Pablo Zuniga Dourado, proferiu na última quinta-feira sentença confirmando a decisão do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) que condenou as empresas aéreas Varig, Tam, Vasp e Transbrasil por praticarem cartel na ponte aérea Rio São Paulo (rota Santos Dumont/Congonhas) em agosto de 1999. O Cade havia apurado que, uma semana após a realização de uma reunião entre seus dirigentes, referidas empresas aéreas reajustaram de forma linear e uniforme os preços das passagens em 10%. Por isso, aplicou multas no valor de R$ 633.695,04 (Tam), R$ 3.213.214,42 (Varig).
Objetivando anular a decisão tomada pelo Plenário do Cade, a Tam e a Varig ingressaram com duas ações na Seção Judiciária do Distrito Federal. Ao julgar pela improcedência dos pleitos, o Juiz da 3ª Vara Federal considerou que: "andou bem a autoridade antitruste quando entendeu se constituir indício a reunião realizada pelas empresas aéreas. É dizer: não é a aritmética quem dirá acerca da existência ou não de práticas anticoncorrenciais, mas os efeitos das condutas comerciais dos agentes inseridos no mesmo mercado relevante geográfico e material". Ao final, concluiu o juiz que: "as provas dos autos em conjunto, levam a inevitável conclusão de que os autores fizeram acordos horizontais a fim de fixar preços uniformes. Construíram cartel e prejudicaram os consumidores."
"Empresas concorrentes não podem combinar preços ou quaisquer estratégias comerciais. Quando isso ocorre, os consumidores são roubados, postos de trabalhos deixam de ser criados e o país diminui o crescimento" afirmou o procurador-geral do Cade, Arthur Badin. "A decisão judicial renova nossa convicção de que o Poder Judiciário tem um papel importantíssimo na implementação da política antitruste, sobretudo quando desincentiva tentativas de reverter decisões tecnicamente irreprováveis do Cade", completou.
Fonte: Assessoria de Imprensa do Cade
O Juiz da 3ª Vara da Justiça Federal em Brasília, Pablo Zuniga Dourado, proferiu na última quinta-feira sentença confirmando a decisão do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) que condenou as empresas aéreas Varig, Tam, Vasp e Transbrasil por praticarem cartel na ponte aérea Rio São Paulo (rota Santos Dumont/Congonhas) em agosto de 1999. O Cade havia apurado que, uma semana após a realização de uma reunião entre seus dirigentes, referidas empresas aéreas reajustaram de forma linear e uniforme os preços das passagens em 10%. Por isso, aplicou multas no valor de R$ 633.695,04 (Tam), R$ 3.213.214,42 (Varig).
Objetivando anular a decisão tomada pelo Plenário do Cade, a Tam e a Varig ingressaram com duas ações na Seção Judiciária do Distrito Federal. Ao julgar pela improcedência dos pleitos, o Juiz da 3ª Vara Federal considerou que: "andou bem a autoridade antitruste quando entendeu se constituir indício a reunião realizada pelas empresas aéreas. É dizer: não é a aritmética quem dirá acerca da existência ou não de práticas anticoncorrenciais, mas os efeitos das condutas comerciais dos agentes inseridos no mesmo mercado relevante geográfico e material". Ao final, concluiu o juiz que: "as provas dos autos em conjunto, levam a inevitável conclusão de que os autores fizeram acordos horizontais a fim de fixar preços uniformes. Construíram cartel e prejudicaram os consumidores."
"Empresas concorrentes não podem combinar preços ou quaisquer estratégias comerciais. Quando isso ocorre, os consumidores são roubados, postos de trabalhos deixam de ser criados e o país diminui o crescimento" afirmou o procurador-geral do Cade, Arthur Badin. "A decisão judicial renova nossa convicção de que o Poder Judiciário tem um papel importantíssimo na implementação da política antitruste, sobretudo quando desincentiva tentativas de reverter decisões tecnicamente irreprováveis do Cade", completou.
quinta-feira, 1 de maio de 2008
An empirical model of low-cost carrier entry
A paper from the Latin American Center for Transportation Economics (LACTE), Brazil:
OLIVEIRA, A. V. M . An empirical model of low-cost carrier entry. Transportation Research. Part A, Policy and Practice, v. 42, p. 673-695, 2008.
Abstract
Competition between low-cost carriers in rapid expansion and full-service network carriers has definitely become one of the most relevant issues of the airline industry. The present paper addresses this matter by analyzing the entry of the low-cost Gol Airlines, in the Brazilian domestic market, in 2001. A route-choice model is estimated by making use of a flexible post-entry equilibrium profits equation and accounting for endogeneity of the main variables. Results indicate the relevance of market size and rival's route presence as underlying determinants of profitability. Furthermore, it is also performed an analysis of the consistency of Gol's entry patterns with the route-choice behavior classically established by the pre-eminent US low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines - that is, a focus on short-haul and high-density markets. Evidence is found that although Gol initiated operations by reproducing the behavior of Southwest, it quickly diversified its portfolio of routes and, at the margin, became more in accordance with the pattern of entry of JetBlue Airways (another successful US low-cost carrier), focusing mainly on longer-haul markets, albeit with some relevant country-specific idiosyncrasies.
OLIVEIRA, A. V. M . An empirical model of low-cost carrier entry. Transportation Research. Part A, Policy and Practice, v. 42, p. 673-695, 2008.
Abstract
Competition between low-cost carriers in rapid expansion and full-service network carriers has definitely become one of the most relevant issues of the airline industry. The present paper addresses this matter by analyzing the entry of the low-cost Gol Airlines, in the Brazilian domestic market, in 2001. A route-choice model is estimated by making use of a flexible post-entry equilibrium profits equation and accounting for endogeneity of the main variables. Results indicate the relevance of market size and rival's route presence as underlying determinants of profitability. Furthermore, it is also performed an analysis of the consistency of Gol's entry patterns with the route-choice behavior classically established by the pre-eminent US low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines - that is, a focus on short-haul and high-density markets. Evidence is found that although Gol initiated operations by reproducing the behavior of Southwest, it quickly diversified its portfolio of routes and, at the margin, became more in accordance with the pattern of entry of JetBlue Airways (another successful US low-cost carrier), focusing mainly on longer-haul markets, albeit with some relevant country-specific idiosyncrasies.
segunda-feira, 31 de março de 2008
Com mais gastos, lucro da TAM cai 78,9% e atinge R$ 128,9 Mi
Folha de SP, 31/3/2008
Segundo comunicado enviado ao mercado, a receita líquida da empresa foi de R$ 8,151 bilhões em 2006
A empresa aérea TAM informou nesta segunda-feira que encerrou 2007 com lucro líquido consolidado de R$ 128,896 milhões, queda de 78,93% na comparação com o lucro de 2006, que atingiu R$ 611,750 milhões. O principal impacto na queda, segundo a companhia, foi o aumento de custos gerados pela incorporação de 20 aeronaves à frota ao longo de 2007.
Segundo comunicado enviado ao mercado, a receita líquida da empresa foi de R$ 8,151 bilhões no ano passado, alta de 10,98% sobre 2006. O lucro bruto da companhia, por sua vez, caiu para R$ 2,292 bilhões no ano passado, após os R$ 2,613 bilhões registrados um ano antes. O lucro operacional caiu para R$ 212,695 milhões, redução de 77,05% ante 2006.
O Ebitdar (índice em inglês que representa o resultado operacional antes de despesas financeiras líquidas, depreciação, amortização e arrendamentos) somou R$ 352,88 milhões ante R$ 437,31 milhões no quarto trimestre de 2006, enquanto a margem no mesmo período passou de 22,5% para 15,4%.
No quarto trimestre, o lucro líquido foi de R$ 49,8 milhões, redução de 63,5% sobre os R$ 136,2 milhões obtidos um ano antes. A TAM explica que no período, os custos dos serviços prestados e despesas operacionais aumentaram 28,5%, atingindo R$ 2.202,4 milhões, comparados com R$ 1.714,1 milhões em 2006.
Os principais motivos foram aumento de combustíveis, despesas de comercialização e marketing, pessoal, tarifas de pouso e decolagem e de auxílio à navegação, despesas com manutenção e revisão e arrendamento de aeronaves e equipamentos.
A TAM informou ainda que, no quarto trimestre, atingiu fatia de mercado doméstico de 48,2% no mercado internacional, ficou com 71,5%. A taxa de ocupação média nos vôos domésticos foi de 70,5%. No ano, a empresa transportou 27,85 milhões de passageiros, alta de 11,3% sobre os 25,02 milhões de 2006.
"Estimávamos manter uma média de 13 horas voadas por aeronave por dia, mas devido a restrições operacionais no aeroporto de Congonhas durante parte do ano de 2007, atingimos uma média de 12,6 horas", explica a empresa em documento.
Para 2008, a companhia prevê alta de 8% a 12% na demanda no mercado doméstico. A expectativa é que a taxa de ocupação de suas aeronaves fique em cerca de 70%.
Segundo comunicado enviado ao mercado, a receita líquida da empresa foi de R$ 8,151 bilhões em 2006
A empresa aérea TAM informou nesta segunda-feira que encerrou 2007 com lucro líquido consolidado de R$ 128,896 milhões, queda de 78,93% na comparação com o lucro de 2006, que atingiu R$ 611,750 milhões. O principal impacto na queda, segundo a companhia, foi o aumento de custos gerados pela incorporação de 20 aeronaves à frota ao longo de 2007.
Segundo comunicado enviado ao mercado, a receita líquida da empresa foi de R$ 8,151 bilhões no ano passado, alta de 10,98% sobre 2006. O lucro bruto da companhia, por sua vez, caiu para R$ 2,292 bilhões no ano passado, após os R$ 2,613 bilhões registrados um ano antes. O lucro operacional caiu para R$ 212,695 milhões, redução de 77,05% ante 2006.
O Ebitdar (índice em inglês que representa o resultado operacional antes de despesas financeiras líquidas, depreciação, amortização e arrendamentos) somou R$ 352,88 milhões ante R$ 437,31 milhões no quarto trimestre de 2006, enquanto a margem no mesmo período passou de 22,5% para 15,4%.
No quarto trimestre, o lucro líquido foi de R$ 49,8 milhões, redução de 63,5% sobre os R$ 136,2 milhões obtidos um ano antes. A TAM explica que no período, os custos dos serviços prestados e despesas operacionais aumentaram 28,5%, atingindo R$ 2.202,4 milhões, comparados com R$ 1.714,1 milhões em 2006.
Os principais motivos foram aumento de combustíveis, despesas de comercialização e marketing, pessoal, tarifas de pouso e decolagem e de auxílio à navegação, despesas com manutenção e revisão e arrendamento de aeronaves e equipamentos.
A TAM informou ainda que, no quarto trimestre, atingiu fatia de mercado doméstico de 48,2% no mercado internacional, ficou com 71,5%. A taxa de ocupação média nos vôos domésticos foi de 70,5%. No ano, a empresa transportou 27,85 milhões de passageiros, alta de 11,3% sobre os 25,02 milhões de 2006.
"Estimávamos manter uma média de 13 horas voadas por aeronave por dia, mas devido a restrições operacionais no aeroporto de Congonhas durante parte do ano de 2007, atingimos uma média de 12,6 horas", explica a empresa em documento.
Para 2008, a companhia prevê alta de 8% a 12% na demanda no mercado doméstico. A expectativa é que a taxa de ocupação de suas aeronaves fique em cerca de 70%.
quarta-feira, 26 de março de 2008
[Recordar é Viver] OceanAir acusa TAM e Gol de prática de dumping
Agência Estado [26/03/2008]
A OceanAir, com estréia na ponte aérea marcada para o dia 31, acusa a TAM e a Gol de estarem praticando dumping para fazer com que a companhia desista de operar nessa rota. O diretor de tráfego e planejamento da OceanAir, Waldomiro Silva Júnior, afirma que a TAM está vendendo a passagem de um trecho São Paulo-Rio a R$ 189 nos horários próximos dos da OceanAir, que vai cobrar R$ 169 durante o lançamento dessa linha.
Já a Gol, conta o executivo, está cobrando o mesmo preço da OceanAir. TAM e Gol foram procuradas, mas não se pronunciaram até a conclusão do texto. "Essa já é uma prática das duas empresas. O governo deveria fazer alguma coisa, pois elas baixam o preço e depois sobem. É dumping", afirma Júnior. Segundo o executivo, nos horários que a OceanAir não têm vôos na ponte aérea, a passagem da TAM custa R$ 359 e da Gol, R$ 313.
A OceanAir, com estréia na ponte aérea marcada para o dia 31, acusa a TAM e a Gol de estarem praticando dumping para fazer com que a companhia desista de operar nessa rota. O diretor de tráfego e planejamento da OceanAir, Waldomiro Silva Júnior, afirma que a TAM está vendendo a passagem de um trecho São Paulo-Rio a R$ 189 nos horários próximos dos da OceanAir, que vai cobrar R$ 169 durante o lançamento dessa linha.
Já a Gol, conta o executivo, está cobrando o mesmo preço da OceanAir. TAM e Gol foram procuradas, mas não se pronunciaram até a conclusão do texto. "Essa já é uma prática das duas empresas. O governo deveria fazer alguma coisa, pois elas baixam o preço e depois sobem. É dumping", afirma Júnior. Segundo o executivo, nos horários que a OceanAir não têm vôos na ponte aérea, a passagem da TAM custa R$ 359 e da Gol, R$ 313.
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